most microeconomic models assume that decision makers wish to
what links the decisions of consumers and firms in a market?
economic models are most often tested
which of the statements below is/are normative?
convexity of indifference curves implies that consumers are willing to
if two bundles are on the same indifference curve, then
if the utility for two goods "x" and "y" is measured as u = x y, then it can be concluded that
joe's income is $500, the price of food (f) is $2 per unit, and the price of shelter (s) is $100. which of the following represents his budget constraint?
the consumer is in equilibrium when
by selecting a bundle where mrs = mrt, the consumer is saying
if mrs > mrt, then the consumer is better off than at equilibrium.
an inidual's demand curve for a good can be derived by measuring the quantities selected as
sandy derives utility from consuming "all other goods," g, and clean air (measured by particulate matter removed per m3), a, as measured by the utility function u(g,a) = g0.6a0.4. the price of "all other goods" is $20 and the price of clean air (abatement) equals $10. brian is the only other consumer in the market for clean air and demands 10 units of clean air. what is the market demand for clean air?
efficient production occurs if a firm
firms maximize profit when
with respect to production, the short run is best defined as a time period
in the long run, all factors of production are
which of the following statements is not true?
suppose the total cost of producing t-shirts can be represented as tc = 50 2q. the marginal cost of the 5th t-shirt is
if average cost is decreasing,
variable costs are
the canadian metal chair manufacturing market has n = 78 firms. the estimated elasticity of supply is ηo = 3.1, and the estimated elasticity of demand is ε = - 1.1. assuming that the firms are identical, calculate the elasticity of demand facing a single firm.
if the inverse demand function for toasters is p = 60 - q, what is the consumer surplus if price is 30?
market where no single buyer or seller can influence the price is
if a competitive firm maximizes short-run profits by producing some quantity of output, which of the following must be true at that level of output?
the deadweight loss generated by a perfect-price-discriminating monopoly
monopolistically competitive firms
if the demand curve a monopolist faces is perfectly elastic, then the ratio of the firm's price to the marginal cost is
depend on following three-player game, where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns and player 3 matrices which strategy of player 1 is strictly dominated?
depend on following three-player game, where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns and player 3 matrices what’s nash equilibrium of this game?
(first-price sealed-bid auction) alice is selling her 2000 chevrolet cavalier to her friends, bob and charles. bob attaches a value of s$8,000 to alice's old car, while charles's value of the car is s$10,000. (these valuations are common knowledge between bob and charles.) alice designs the following auction to sell her car: first, she asks each of them to write his bid on a piece of paper. then bob and charles give their bids (nonnegative integers) to alice. notice that when bob and charles write down their bids, they don't know each other's bid (so called "sealed bid"). after alice receives the sealed bids, the bids are shown to everyone, and the car will be sold to the person who has the higher bid at the price equal to his own bid. when there is a tie (bob and charles bid the same amount), then alice would flip a fair coin to decide who will get the car. in this game, bob has 8000 strategies and charles has 10000 strategies.
(first-price sealed-bid auction) alice is selling her 2000 chevrolet cavalier to her friends, bob and charles. bob attaches a value of s$8,000 to alice's old car, while charles's value of the car is s$10,000. (these valuations are common knowledge between bob and charles.) alice designs the following auction to sell her car: first, she asks each of them to write his bid on a piece of paper. then bob and charles give their bids (nonnegative integers) to alice. notice that when bob and charles write down their bids, they don't know each other's bid (so called "sealed bid"). after alice receives the sealed bids, the bids are shown to everyone, and the car will be sold to the person who has the higher bid at the price equal to his own bid. when there is a tie (bob and charles bid the same amount), then alice would flip a fair coin to decide who will get the car. in this game bob bids 8000 and charles bids 8000 is a nash equilibrium.
(first-price sealed-bid auction) alice is selling her 2000 chevrolet cavalier to her friends, bob and charles. bob attaches a value of s$8,000 to alice's old car, while charles's value of the car is s$10,000. (these valuations are common knowledge between bob and charles.) alice designs the following auction to sell her car: first, she asks each of them to write his bid on a piece of paper. then bob and charles give their bids (nonnegative integers) to alice. notice that when bob and charles write down their bids, they don't know each other's bid (so called "sealed bid"). after alice receives the sealed bids, the bids are shown to everyone, and the car will be sold to the person who has the higher bid at the price equal to his own bid. when there is a tie (bob and charles bid the same amount), then alice would flip a fair coin to decide who will get the car. in this game bob bids 7999 and charles bids 8000 is a nash equilibrium.
player 1 chooses either u or d; player 2 simultaneously chooses either l, m or r. both player know only that game 1 is played by probability p and game 2 is played by probability 1-p how many strategies player 1 has?
player 1 chooses either u or d; player 2 simultaneously chooses either l, m or r. both player know only that game 1 is played by probability p and game 2 is played by probability 1-p how many strategies player 2 has?
player 1 chooses either u or d; player 2 simultaneously chooses either l, m or r. both player know only that game 1 is played by probability p and game 2 is played by probability 1-p what is the reduced game after iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies of each type?
player 1 chooses either u or m; player 2 chooses either l or c. both player know only that game 1 is played by probability p and game 2 is played by probability 1-p how many strategies player 1 has?
player 1 chooses either u or m; player 2 chooses either l or c. both player know only that game 1 is played by probability p and game 2 is played by probability 1-p how many strategies player 2 has?
the increase in total revenue due to increasing the amount of labor employed by one unit is called the( )
if a competitive firm faces a competitive labor market, it will hire labor until( )
if a firm buys its labor in a competitive market, then a short-run increase in the price of the firm's output will cause the firm to( )
in a perfectly competitive resource market the marginal revenue product curve is( )
in a perfectly competitive resource market the labor supply curve facing the single firm is( )